Taliban establishes Atomic Energy Authority with the help of Pakistan, #TalibanIsPakArmy trends wolrdwide

Taliban establishes Afghanistan Atomic Energy Authority in their interim government and appointed Engineer Najibullah as head of the department. With the help of Pakistani nuclear scientists. This has opened up a new level of security threat in the region. And Pakistan Army is keen to exploit the void created in Afghanistan to further their Terror proxy network.

Pakistan is on the FATF grey list since June 2018 due to its complicity in terror funding and support for terrorist groups. During the recent Afghanistan crisis, the nexus of Pakistani Army-ISI with UN banned Haqqani Network leaders, Islamic State and Taliban has been exposed. Which will risk Pakistan being Black Listed soon even with the support of China which tends to block the notion internationally. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog. They help authorities go after the money of criminals dealing with illegal drugs, human trafficking and other crimes.

Meanwhile, Massive protests taking place around the world against the Pakistan Army and its notorious spy agency ISI invasion in Afghanistan. The hashtag #TalibanIsPakArmy is trending worldwide as we speak.

The United States troops withdrawal is turning out to be a global disaster. Think about Taliban terrorists owning nuclear weapons. There are high possibilities the radical elements within Pakistan Army and government might smuggle a few nuclear substances into Afghanistan.

Pakistan track record on nuclear proliferation are well known. On February 4, 2004, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, self-styled father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, appeared on Pakistani television to apologize to his nation. Revealing few details, Khan stated that a government investigation, which followed “disturbing disclosures and evidence by some countries to international agencies” (read “Iran and Libya to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]”), confirmed “alleged proliferation activities by certain Pakistanis and foreigners over the last two decades.” Khan admitted the allegations were true and said “there was never any kind of authorization for these activities by any government official.” Pakistani officials a few days earlier claimed that Khan provided technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea.

On February 5, Khan was pardoned by Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, with no mention of confiscating the millions of dollars he had acquired in more than 20 years of nuclear moonlighting. When asked about Khan’s pardon, U.S. Department of State spokesperson Richard Boucher replied, “I don’t think it’s a matter for the United States to sit in judgment on.”

It is critically important for the United States to judge whether Pakistan has adequately addressed Khan’s proliferation behaviour. The administration’s failure to do so may be symptomatic of a deeper problem in its nonproliferation strategy. By focusing on “hostile states and terrorists” as the main proliferation threat, the Bush strategy ignores friendly countries, such as Pakistan, that host terrorists, place insufficient controls on weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and are threatened with political destabilization.

Ironically, the threat of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction is probably greater in Pakistan than in Iraq, Libya, North Korea, or Iran—all targets of Bush counterproliferation policy. Even more, Pakistan has remained locked in a nuclear confrontation with India, which has several times escalated to the point of an all-out war.

Now thanks to Pakistan, Taliban and ISIS terror groups sponsored by the Pakistani military will get nuclear weapons-making technology. And Pakistan will get away with the help of China and the US.